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SYMPOSIUM

Legitimacy and Autonomy
VALUES OF THE SPEAKING STATE
Frank I. Michelman†
INTRODUCTION
A.

Aims of This Essay

When, if ever—on behalf of what sorts of causes, using
what sorts of instruments and powers—ought the state engage
in political debates, or be required, invited, or permitted by law
to do so? In When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?,1
Corey Brettschneider’s message is that the good state will
sometimes find itself obliged, prudentially and morally, to
assume an active role as partisan in highly charged political
controversies. Brettschneider urges, accordingly, that we will do
best to read—and, as necessary, to change—our constitutional
law to keep or bring it in line with that view.
These propositions are contentious. In support of them,
Brettschneider urges that riding on their acceptance is no
lesser a stake than the legitimacy of the state. Surprisingly,
though, our author nowhere really stops to spell out what
“legitimacy” is—to say what it means to judge a political practice
as legitimate or not, or why we should care about such judgments.
My aim in this commentary is partly supplementary: to fill this
gap in Brettschneider’s exposition. It is also partly critical: to see
how (or whether) the gap can be filled in a way that will
actually support the philosophical and constitutional-legal
† Robert Walmsley University Professor, Emeritus, Harvard University. I
thank Richard Fallon for his helpful comments.
1 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?:
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012).
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stances of State Speaks. I think it can be done, but perhaps
only by ascribing to Brettschneider a somewhat novel (but I do
not say necessarily mistaken) conflation of a liberal-theoretic
notion of normative political legitimacy with a personal-ethical
value of autonomy.
B.

A State Duty of Political Partisanship?

Provocative as Brettschneider’s claims surely are meant
to be, they nevertheless start out from a set of premises that
will likely strike most readers as both innocuous and rightminded. Somewhat loosely restated, and pending more precise
analysis to follow below, these initial premises run as follows.
State political regimes, including democratic ones, are
designed to impose a measure of coercive rule on citizens. The
legitimacy (in the sense of the moral justification) of any state’s
practice of coercive rule is closely tied to the visibility within that
practice of a commitment to conform its operations to certain
principles of regard for the freedom and equality of citizens.2
Actors in civil society—persons and organizations—nevertheless
can, and they sometimes do, emit messages of contradiction and
rejection of these legitimacy-sustaining principles. Such messages
and the ideas they carry are what the book calls “hateful.”3
Persons and groups sometimes send around hateful ideas by the
sentences they utter, and sometimes by the policies and practices
they adopt and follow. Of course there will always be controversy
over which words and practices do and do not cross the line of
contradiction of the legitimacy-sustaining values of free and equal
citizenship (partly because there will always be controversy over
exactly how to define those values).4 But wherever you or I would
draw the line of contradiction, we might be tempted, at least, by
this key thought of Professor Brettschneider: where the state
stands silent in the face of the exhibition of ideas that flagrantly
cross the line of contradiction, that silence can possibly cloud the
visibility and certainty of the state’s own commitment to the
contradicted values, with attendant risk of a resultant loss of
societal attachment to those values.5
All of that, as far as it goes, will doubtless make good
enough sense to most readers. Where many will want to enter a
See, e.g., id. at 49.
See id. at 1 (classifying as “hateful” those views or viewpoints that express
“an idea or ideology that opposes free and equal citizenship”).
4 See id. at 47, 90.
5 See, e.g., id. at 39.
2

3
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strong cautionary reservation is at the point of the book’s
further claim: that the state stands under some kind of
necessitation to depart from a posture of silence in the face of
hateful speech.6 That does not follow, the doubters will say, for
two interconnected reasons: primarily and decisively, because the
“silence” in question is in line with a principle of state neutrality
on the field of political debate, which is itself a basic (or even a
legitimacy-sustaining) commitment of liberal democracy;7
secondarily and supportively, because attentive observers will
accordingly construe the state’s silence as an act of fidelity to
that principle and therefore not as the state’s condonation of
hateful views.8
And so we draw near to what is controversial in Professor
Brettschneider’s book. In State Speaks, Brettschneider asserts the
state’s obligation—“obligation” is his repeated word of choice9—to
respond to hateful speech by its own engagement in a type of
expressive activity that he labels “democratic persuasion.”10
Democratic persuasion comprises the state’s use of a congeries of
communicative means to denounce and oppose the propagation of
“hateful” ideas that plainly and sharply contradict a somewhat
thinly defined, “political” ideal of free and equal citizenship.11 By
Brettschneider’s argument, the state is profoundly duty-bound to
defend that political ideal against attack and attrition, for the
particular reason that a continued public commitment to it
provides the necessary foundation for the state’s legitimacy:
“If . . . hateful doctrines were left to prevail, they could subvert
the basic principles of a legitimate democratic state.”12 The
6 See, e.g., id. at 6 (“[T]he state has the obligation to use its expressive
capacities to defend the values of free and equal citizenship . . . .”).
7 See id. at 9 (describing, while rejecting, “neutralism” as the political
doctrine that “the state should not promote or express any particular set of values”).
8 But see id. at 43-44 (asserting that “[a] state that fails to answer” hateful
views would “risk being seen as . . . complicit in” those views); id. at 84 (same).
9 See, e.g., id. at 6, 47, 111, 122. Brettschneider also sometimes (and
apparently equivalently) speaks in this connection of a “duty” of the state. See, e.g., id.
at 18, 114, 119.
10 See id. at 25 (“[T]he state rightly engages in democratic persuasion when it
exercises its expressive capacity to promote the values of free and equal citizenship.”).
11 See id. at 14 (initially defining this strictly political ideal, as distinct from
“comprehensive” conceptions of metaphysical or social equality); id. at 42-49
(recounting various expressive means available to the state for defending the ideal
against attack).
12 Id. at 7. The message recurs in the book like a drum-beat. See id. at 4
(“These democratic . . .values [of free and equal citizenship] should be . . . promoted by
the state because they ground the legitimacy of government and justify protecting
rights . . . .”); id. at 18 (ascribing to any “legitimate democracy” a duty to promulgate
values that justify rights); id. at 34 (calling “central to legitimacy” the idea that
“citizens should all be treated as free and equal”); id. at 39 (explaining when
considerations of “democratic legitimacy” require efforts by the state to influence public
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approved means of defense encompassed by democratic
persuasion stop short of direct coercive muzzling of hateful
speech, but they do include viewpoint-discriminatory grants
and refusals of state financial support that many might
construe as punitive or regulatory, in purpose or effect.13
This positive duty to defend might not be strictly a legal
one. While Brettschneider affirms that “the ideal of democratic
persuasion . . . provides a guide to identify when state speech is
appropriate,”14 I have found nothing in State Speaks to say that
a court should ever treat a state’s failure to speak as a violation
of constitutional law.15 Rather, when Brettschneider refers to a
state’s obligation, it seems he has in mind a higher calling of
moral or ethical responsibility.16 Be that as it may, Brettschneider
plainly does mean for recognition of this calling to carry over into
our practice of judicially enforced constitutional law, at least to
this extent: he means for it to serve as a decisive reason for not
reading the Constitution in ways that would prevent the state’s
due engagement in democratic persuasion—for why, in other
words, “it should be constitutionally permissible for the state to
speak in favor of values of free and equal citizenship . . . .”17
C.

A Question of Legitimacy?

Readers will ponder and doubtless will differ over how
far, if at all, our author’s claims and proposals depart from
opinion); id. at 44 (calling it “essential in a legitimate society” for the state to explain
the reasons for protecting rights); id. at 66 (affirming the state’s proper role in
articulating “values that “are central to its own legitimacy”); id. at 79 (denying that the
state can be neutral with regard to “defense of values central to its own legitimacy”);
id. at 91 (affirming the state’s role of defending against attack values that “are central
to the legitimacy of the state”).
13 See id. at 109-41 (chapter four).
14 Id. at 4.
15 Brettschneider writes that “citizens . . . have a fundamental entitlement
for the justification [for law] to be articulated,” and that “[s]uch an [entitlement] is
required by rights,” id. at 43, but I doubt that he means either that citizens have a
legal entitlement or that “required by rights” means the entitlement is itself a legal
right. Rather, the entitlement is correlative to an obligation of the state to “promote the
reasons for rights,” id. at 47, which obligation is never presented as a legal obligation.
16 Brettschneider’s text sometimes couples the state’s “duty” or “obligation” to
engage in democratic persuasion with the “duties” or “obligations” of citizens to criticize
the hateful views of others and furthermore to engage in “reflective revision” of their
own hateful-tending beliefs, see, e.g., id. at 7, 21, 28, 93, and he neither plausibly could
nor does in fact regard the citizens’ duties as cognizable or enforceable in law. See id. at
37 (simultaneously asserting both citizens’ “obligation” of reflective revision and right
to “be free to reject” democratic ideals); see id. at 63 (observing that reflective revision
must be an extra-legal, “voluntary” duty because “coercion would deny the kind of
autonomy required for reflective revision”).
17 Id. at 122.
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broad-sense liberal political morality, political wisdom, and
sound constitutional law. Those will not be my questions here.18
I shall rather be looking upstream in Brettschneider’s
argumentation, specifically at his reliance on a political–theoretic
notion of legitimacy to help him move his proposals safely past
predictable resistance from (some) liberal ideologists and
American constitutional lawyers.
Brettschneider writes, after all, as a dedicated disturber
of a widely prevailing, prescriptive imagery of the American
state as neutral umpire in a free contest of ideas. He classes his
work as critical in tenor, fraught with calls for changes (more
politely “reinterpretations”) in the extant jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court.19 He explains with care how his interventions
will likely be found to deviate from American constitutional law
as currently construed by the Court.20 He faults the Court’s work
in general for excessive submission to a doctrine of state
neutrality.21 He expects his views to be contentious among liberal
mainstreamers, with whose outlook he does himself, as a liberal,
feel a strong tug of sympathy.22 He anticipates objection both from
those who worry that viewpoint-discriminatory deployment of the
state’s vocal powers (and of course even more so its powers of the
purse) is already past the limit of coercive control over political
opinions that is tolerable in a democracy,23 and from those who

18 For what it is worth, I would generally associate myself with the views of
Professor Calabresi in this Symposium, see Steven Calabresi, Freedom of Expression
and the Golden Mean, 79 BROOK. L. REV 1005 (2014).
19 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 144.
20 See id. at 98-99 (faulting the Supreme Court’s application of the Bill of
Rights in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); see also id. at 115-25 (faulting the
Court’s neutralist groundings for decisions in regard to the state’s management of
“limited public forums,” its impositions of conditions on recipients of state funds, and
its selective refusals of display-space on state real estate).
21 See id. at 47 (finding the Court’s “jurisprudence” to be “often couched in
excessively value-neutral terms”).
22 Brettschneider defends a strict constitutional rule against viewpointdiscriminatory restrictions on speech. He thus takes sides with civil-libertarian
liberals, against objections that such a rule effectively bars the state from its most
straightforward means of combating the kind of “hateful” speech that he, himself, sees
as posing a threat to values essential to legitimacy. His position is that, at least as long
as a regime is committed to the state’s due engagement in democratic persuasion, its
incorporation of a strict rule against coercive restrictions on viewpoints counts
distinctly in favor of its legitimacy. See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 80-81, 105;
infra Part II.A.4.
23 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 7 (addressing those “who are concerned
about excessive state power”); at 12 (same); at 94 (addressing the view that “state action—
even when limited to expression—falls into the category of coercion per se”).
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start with a strong intuition that, coercion entirely aside, strict
state neutrality is essential in a just political regime.24
Neither group will be initially disposed to draw much
comfort from the suggestion that the state is morally licensed
to speak only in defense of “the right values.”25 And how, then,
will our author hope to convert the liberal doubters? I have
already told you a key part of the answer: “Legitimacy!” A due
regard for that sovereign political-moral value should lead
reluctant liberals toward acceptance of a departure from
“neutralism” in deference to a higher necessity of the state’s
due engagement in democratic persuasion.26
I.

THE ARGUMENT FROM LEGITIMACY

A.

A Standard Liberal Discourse of Legitimacy

Whatever Brettschneider means by “legitimacy,” it must
be a value of relatively urgent concern to liberals. But what
exactly is this value?
Common political discourse applies the terms
“legitimate” and “legitimacy” to any of a number of different
objects.27 These can range from particular acts or behaviors of
specific institutional components of a legal system (say, a
decision of the Supreme Court), to entire political orders or
regimes, as perhaps represented by a country’s constitution or
body of constitutional laws.28 The discourse furthermore uses
these terms to target any of a number of different virtues or
merits in or of those objects.29 Some measure of ambiguity,
therefore, must attend upon Brettschneider’s invocations of
“legitimacy” in support of his prescriptions for state engagement
24 See id. at 9 (addressing the “neutralist” doctrine that “the state should not
promote . . . any particular set of values”); id. at 73 (same).
25 Id. at 123.
26 See authorities cited in note 12, supra.
27 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1802 (2005). For a thorough and meticulous survey and analysis of these
usages and their complex (often subtle) interconnections, including references to a wide
sweep of the literature, see generally id.
28
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993) (casting a
“liberal principle of legitimacy” in terms of the appearance within a country’s
constitution of certain “essential” provisions). But see Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way:
Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 42 FORD. L. REV. 345, 360-62
(2003) (questioning a strict equation, for this purpose, of a state’s regime with its strictsense constitution).
29 See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1790-91 (differentiating among “legal,”
“sociological,” and “moral” legitimacy); id. at 1792 (differentiating between “ideal” and
“minimal” moral legitimacy).
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in democratic persuasion, until we have narrowed down to one
each (a) the class of targeted objects and (b) the desired virtue or
merit in objects in that class, to which Brettschneider means
those invocations to refer. To this end, we rely as closely as
possible on Brettschneider’s texts, construing them in the light
of the apparent needs of his argument.
1. The Object Class: Legitimacy of the State Political
Order
We can deal quickly with object classes. Words and
purposes conspire to show that Brettschneider’s concern is with
attributions of merit to entire, constitution-bound, state-centered
practices of social ordering maintained, in part, by coercive laws.
His text consistently refers, in terms, to the question of the
legitimacy of “the state” (or, equivalently, of the “government,”
“society,”
or
“democracy”
in
question).30
His
claims
characteristically turn on an idea of the state’s special calling to
uphold the terms and conditions on which its legitimacy is said to
depend.31 Such usages are standard within the common discourse.32
And of course Brettschneider’s argument to reluctant liberals
becomes orders of magnitude more urgent when taken to mean
that the meritoriousness (in some sense) of an entire constitutional
order (not just of one or another specific institutional act or
arrangement within that order) depends on a state’s due
engagement in democratic persuasion.
2. The “Moral” (Not Merely “Sociological”) Legitimacy of
the State Regime
We come, then, to the question of the particular
meritorious character—the particular targeted virtue of a
political regime—at which a legitimacy judgment (in
30 See authorities cited in note 12, supra. Brettschneider does twice speak of
the Supreme Court treating “certain laws” as legitimate (or not), see BRETTSCHNEIDER,
supra note 1, at 82, or striking down certain “laws” as illegitimate, see id. at 149. These
applications of legitimacy judgments to individual laws are best understood as
parasitic on their application to state level regimes or constitutions: an “illegitimate”
law being simply a law that fails to conform either to a legitimate constitution or to
principles that any legitimate constitution supposedly would contain. (Thus, in striking
down certain laws as illegitimate, the Supreme Court does so “because the reasons and
beliefs for such laws violate public principles that are central to the state’s own
legitimacy.” Id. at 149.).
31 See authorities cited in note 12, supra.
32 See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1796 (“The leading theories of moral and
political legitimacy have primarily addressed the legitimacy of constitutions or
governmental regimes . . . .”).
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Brettschneider’s usage) is aimed. A sufficiently complete response
will take us through several steps. The first is that Brettschneider
here is not just talking about legitimacy in what has been called a
“sociological” sense of that term, referring to current facts of
acceptance by the populace of the regime’s claim to merited
political authority.33 Rather, he means legitimacy in its normative
or regulative sense of a standard of “rightful rule”34—a measure of
the regime’s moral “worthiness to be recognized”35—that we as
external evaluators bring to the table.36
As between a descriptive–sociological and a regulative–
moral construction of legitimacy judgments, only the latter will fit
comfortably with both our author’s words and his argumentative
purposes. Brettschneider carefully differentiates “the crucial
value of legitimacy” from the value of (mere) “stability.”37
“Legitimacy,” in his pages, comes regularly coupled with
“justification.” In order for the state “to be legitimate and for the
laws to be justifiable to all,” he writes, the state must be
committed to the equal status of citizens.38 “Central to the
legitimacy of the democratic state” is the idea that coercion of
citizens by law requires sufficient “justifying reasons.”39
The apparent point of these remarks is to supply reluctant
liberals with a super-compelling reason to give ground on what
they have been accustomed to regard as a main principle of
democratic political rectitude: strict state neutrality on the field of
political debate. Avoidance of a loss to the state’s moral-sense
legitimacy undoubtedly supplies a reason of that kind.40
Avoidance of a substantial risk of loss of the state’s sociological
legitimacy might also, of course, supply such a reason, but only if
we are shown credible grounds for belief that such a risk is really
pending. I believe few readers would think it plausible to
See id. at 1790, 1795 (defining a “sociological” usage for “legitimacy”).
COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELFGOVERNMENT 18 n.23 (2007).
35 Fallon, supra note 27, at 1796 n.25 (quoting JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Beacon Press 1979) (1976)).
36 See id. at 1797-98 (noting several kinds of evaluative theories that various
evaluators employ).
37 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 107 (“If we focus solely on the value
of stability and ignore the crucial value of legitimacy, we would have no way of
distinguishing between a stable Hobbesian leviathan and a stable rights-protecting
liberal society.”); id. at 30 & 180 n.4 (endorsing John Rawls’s distinction between a
“modus vivendi” and “stability for the right reasons” and equating the latter with a
regime’s legitimacy).
38 Id. at 14.
39 Id. at 49.
40 See infra Part I.A.5.
33

34
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maintain, and Brettschneider at no point suggests any reason
to believe, that the American state’s sociological legitimacy has
been placed at risk by the state’s obvious failure, to date, to
commit to a policy of engagement in democratic persuasion, up
to, or anywhere near the level prescribed in State Speaks.41
3. Legitimacy as the Test of Our Moral License for
Support of the State Regime
Brettschneider’s “legitimacy,” we have so far rather
comfortably discerned, calls for a regulative, not a merely
descriptive, judgment aimed at entire state-level regimes of
political rule. And so we come to a third point, which also, like
those first two, fits easily into the common discourse: to wit, the
legitimacy judgment is specifically concerned with the presence or
absence of moral justification for the coercive aspects of legal
ordering by and under the regime in question. In a prior book,
Brettschneider wrote that a certain, normative conception of
democracy provides “the best way to legitimize the state’s use of
force.”42 In State Speaks, he writes that “central to the legitimacy
of the democratic state” is the idea that “[c]itizens should be
coerced” only in accordance with certain kinds of reasons.43
Thus, Brettschneider endorses a standard line of liberal
thought, which runs, in short, as follows44: Effective legal ordering
is a very great political value. In pursuit of this value, the state
must be able to exert credible and effective demands on everyone
for a general regularity of compliance with its duly issued laws,
like or agree with them or not. Such a demand requires a degree
of further justification before supposedly free and equal citizens.45
To judge a state regime legitimate is to say that it contains a
sufficient set of justice-serving or human-serving structures,
assurances, and commitments to give everyone prevailing reasons
for compliance—and thus to make morally supportable our own
41 In further support of a regulative construction of Brettschneider’s use of
“legitimacy” in BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, we may take note of his use of
“legitimacy” in a prior book to mean the standard of “rightful rule” or of “the
justifications of coercion” or of “the state’s use of force.” BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note
34, at 8, 11, 18 n.23, 24, 54, 59.
42 Id. at 11.
43 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 49.
44 See Michelman, supra note 28, at 345-47 (recapitulating this standard line
of liberal thought); see also Fallon, supra note 27, at 1798 (describing in similar terms a
class of “minimal” theories of moral legitimacy as applied to political regimes).
45 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 54 (calling it “bedrock” in liberal
political theory that “state action must be justified to individuals who are recognized as
free and equal citizens”).
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collaboration with the regime’s demand for compliance—despite
everyone’s awareness of unresolved uncertainties and
disagreements about the justice or other merits of this, that, or
the other of the state’s laws and legislative policies. “Legitimate”
connotes compliance with a “threshold” standard, “above which
legal regimes are [deemed] sufficiently just to deserve the support
of those who are subject to them in the absence of better,
realistically attainable alternatives.”46
4. Legitimacy as a Categorical Judgment
Judgments regarding legitimacy are “categorical” if they
allow only “yes” and “no” as answers. They are “scalar” if they
allow for adverbially inflected answers such as “highly,” “weakly,”
and so on. Judgments regarding “sociological” legitimacy are
scalar.47 By contrast, a judgment regarding the moral-sense
legitimacy of a state must be categorical, because it is
simultaneously a judgment regarding our moral permission to
call on others to go along with a regime that cannot credibly claim
to be fully just in the eyes of many (if any) of its constituents.
Permission cannot be more or less; either you have it or you
don’t. The judgment regarding permission may be close and
doubtful or plain and certain, but it has to be made, yes or no,
one way or other. “Out” or “safe,” “goal” or “no goal,” there is
nothing in between. Collaboration with the regime is either
permitted—it is “adequately morally justified”48—or it is not.
Is Brettschneider on board? Does he really mean that a
state’s failure of active democratic engagement, when the
occasion calls, results in a cancellation of our moral permission
to support the existing state order’s demands for compliance in
general with its laws? The question merits some discussion.
Consider Brettschneider’s account of the state’s obligation
of respect for individual rights of expression, association, and
conscience. In the name and service of legitimacy, Brettschneider
calls for a strict constitutional rule against direct, viewpointdiscriminatory restrictions of speech by the state.49 His claim,
however, is specifically not that state legitimacy is categorically
dependent on the adoption of such a rule. Rather, he says that an
otherwise well-formed regime can improve its legitimacy-score by
See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1798.
See id. at 1796 (commenting that legitimacy in the “sociological” sense is “a
variable, not a constant”).
48 Id. at 1799.
49 See, e.g., BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 12, 22, 73.
46
47
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incorporating such a rule. No doubt the rule may cost something
in reduced protection against the spread of hateful views, but,
still, allowing in this way for recognition of individual rights
can, in the right conditions, yield an “increase” or “gain” to
democratic legitimacy “overall.”50
Is Brettschneider then treating judgments of a state’s
moral-sense legitimacy as scalar? I do not think so. We ought
not to read him as meaning, nonsensically, that we could be “a
little bit permitted” to collaborate as opposed (say) to “very
permitted.” We should rather read him as saying, with perfect
good sense, that restricting the state to combating hateful
views by means that also respect individual freedom rights
makes it likelier than otherwise that we will conclude a
complex weighing of pros and cons by finding—categorically—
in favor of permission.
5. Interim Summation of Brettschneider’s “Legitimacy”
According to our findings so far, Brettschneider’s
“legitimacy” means an external moral standard, applicable to
an entire state regime or to its constitution, by which we judge
the following: first, the regime’s moral entitlement (or lack of
it) to claim from its citizens or subjects a general disposition to
comply with its duly enacted laws, just because they are its laws;
and, second, our own moral permission (or lack of it) to give our
continuing support to that regime. It should be clear how neat is
the fit between this typical-liberal notion of legitimacy and
Brettschneider’s argumentative needs. When our author invokes
legitimacy in support of his prescriptions regarding the state’s
energetic engagement in democratic persuasion, in defense of the
ideal of free and equal citizenship, he is suggesting to reluctant
liberals that a rejection of those prescriptions sets us well on the
way toward forfeiture of our moral license to support the extant
rule-of-law regime in our country. That surely would give anyone
a super-compelling sort of reason to reconsider whatever
resistance to those prescriptions he or she might otherwise be
feeling. But of course the reason will hold for you or for me only
insofar as we find persuasive the proposition that the state’s
due engagement in democratic persuasion, in defense of a
political ideal of free and equal citizenship, really is a
requirement of state legitimacy. We now turn our attention
toward that question of persuasiveness.
50

See id. at 16, 80-81, 105.

996

B.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

Toward a Problem for Brettschneider
1. Legitimacy: “Strong” or “Weak”?

We asked rhetorically, above, whether Brettschneider
“really means” that a certain kind of failure of our state and its
officials—to engage sufficiently in a vocal, pedagogical defense
of a certain ideal of free and equal citizenship—can result in a
cancellation of our moral permission to support the existing
state order’s demands for compliance in general with its laws.
The answer, so far, is that indeed Brettschneider does mean
that. The question then becomes, for each of us, whether we
believe it. Is that, to us, a plausible proposition?
Notice, now, that the answer may depend on how strong
and demanding—or, oppositely, how weak and forgiving—is
our conception of a standard for the legitimacy of a state
regime. The lower the level of demandingness at which we set
the standard, the less likely are we to conclude that any given
feature of the state or its operations is a make-or-break
requirement for its fulfillment. If (say) all that is required for
the legitimacy of a state regime is its credible constitutional
commitment to periodic elections of officials and respect for
such libertarian fundamentals as freedom from arbitrary arrest
and freedom from censorship of political expression—a “weak”
standard—then Brettschneider’s claim that legitimacy depends
on a state’s active engagement in a vocal defense of free and
equal citizenship will ring hollow. But if, to the contrary, the
standard of legitimacy incorporates every true element of
political and social justice as you or I might understand them—
a “strong” standard—the claim could have a good deal more
traction. It follows, interestingly, that to the extent we might
find Brettschneider himself endorsing the idea of a weak
legitimacy standard, we will also find him, to that same extent,
impeaching the credibility of his claim that legitimacy stands
or falls with the adequacy of the state’s engagement in
democratic persuasion in support of free and equal citizenship.
And that extent, as we are about to find, is considerable.
2. The “Substance-Based Limit”: Defense Only of a
Political Ideal, Thinly Defined
Brettschneider imposes what he calls a “substancebased limit” on the state’s moral calling, and corresponding
constitutional license, to engage in democratic persuasion. The
calling and license only cover responses to clear, unmistakable
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attacks on a strictly political (as opposed to “comprehensive”)
ideal of equal citizenship.51 For example, expressions of views
opposing egalitarian economic policies, or denying that the races,
or the sexes, or the sexual orientations, have been created equal,
or that they are equally fit for social companionship, or that
secular liberals have truer ideas than devout Christians about the
path to the good life, would all easily fall on the “comprehensive”
side of the line and would fail to activate the state’s limited
license to respond.52 Such expressions are to be distinguished
from attacks on the strictly political proposition of civic
equality, equality before the state and its law. This means an
equality of all persons in matters of rights, of citizenship, of
public official and legal standing; it is an equality, therefore, of
attribution to persons of entitlements to civic respect and,
correspondingly, of their endowments with the “moral powers”
that engage and make meaningful the enjoyment by persons of
all those forms of public and legal recognition.53
“Hateful” speech, in Brettschneider’s vocabulary, includes
only speech that more-or-less flagrantly transgresses the thinly
defined, political ideal of civic equality.54 Speech that is otherwise
more comprehensively inegalitarian does not activate the state’s
license to respond. Doubtless, there are hard cases. The line will
not always be clear or easily drawn. That fact does not obscure
Brettschneider’s ambition to restrict his claim of an active state
duty to the protection of an ideal that is “public” as opposed to
“comprehensive,” “political” as opposed to “metaphysical”55—
thin (as we may say) as opposed to thick.
Why so? The Rawlsian vocabulary (not to mention the
express appeals to the authority of John Rawls56) point straight
to the answer. It seems that Brettschneider, like Rawls and
like “political” liberals more widely, is in search of basic terms
of social cooperation that leave the maximum possible latitude
for the moral autonomy of citizens, and so could be found
acceptable by citizens holding widely differing, conflicting, even
irreconcilable views about some of the deepest questions humans
can face about the right and the good.57 From there, it would seem

See id. at 14, 47, 89-90.
See id. at 14, 18, 36.
53 See id. at 8, 31, 34-35, 88.
54 See id. at 47, 90.
55 Id. at 14, 30-31.
56 See id. at 30, 34, 35 & 178 n.10, 52 & 180 n.4, 53 & 180 n.5.
57
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 28, at xx (inquiring how “free and equal
citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical,
51
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to follow that Brettschneider will join political liberals, as well, in
their advocacy of a relatively weakened standard of state
legitimacy. The next two sections will briefly explain why.
3. Legitimacy as a “Weakened” Standard
What, after all, are we doing with this normative–
regulative notion of a state regime’s “legitimacy?” Why don’t we
simply speak in terms of the regime’s compliance (or not) with
the principles of justice for a state regime, and have done with
it? A key to the answer, surely, is our knowledge that, in
modern free societies, citizens will divide, gravely and
intractably, not only over their conceptions of the right and the
good, but over their conceptions of what justice truly requires of a
state regime in exactly those circumstances: regarding, say,
affirmative action, campaign-finance controls, socioeconomic
rights, gay marriage, assisted suicide, vouchers for religiously
affiliated schools, and on we go.58 Fifty years hence the list will be
different but no shorter. The point of introducing a regulative
concept of political legitimacy, to stand beside our various,
competing conceptions of justice, is to open a path to morally
justified collaboration, by citizens and officials, in demands for
a prevailing regularity of compliance by everyone with
constitution-conforming laws and policies, regardless of
expected, persisting conflict regarding the compliance with
justice of this policy or that one, or indeed of this or that
feature in the constitution itself. Obviously, in order to do that
work, the standard of legitimacy will have to be weaker, less
demanding, more forgiving, than will be many, if not all, of the
competing conceptions of full-fledged justice that various
citizens and parties may support.
It is important, for our purposes, to note that the liberaltheoretic fallback from full and perfect justice to a standard of
legitimacy is not simply a practical-minded compromise with
human frailty. It is furthermore and distinctly, in the minds of
many, a morally principled response to perceived facts of
reasonable disagreement or “pluralism” in modern liberal
and moral doctrines” can find a way to “live together and all affirm the political
conception of a constitutional regime”).
58 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (1999) (pointing to the
fact of intractable disagreement over what would constitute “justice,” or “fair terms of
social co-operation,” among citizens who disagree deeply among themselves over
questions of the right and the good); Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity, and
Constitutional Patriotism, 76 DENVER U. L. REV. 1009, 1022-23 (1999) (making a
comparable point in regard to questions of constitutional interpretation).

2014]

LEGITIMACY AND AUTONOMY

999

societies. Legitimacy, then, is the notion that aims to allow for a
reasonable convergence by everyone on the regime’s minimumbaseline moral worthiness of support,59 while at the same time
conveying due respect and regard for all parties to intractable
disagreements about the justice and other merits of the regime
and its various legislative stances.60 Brettschneider’s sympathy
with views of this kind is plain on the face of his text.61 Such
views, as we see, inevitably point toward a relatively lax and
forgiving standard of legitimacy.
4. Legitimacy and Transparency
There remains yet a further word to say on this point,
and one that goes to deepen somewhat our doubt of the
plausibility of the claim that a state’s energetic engagement in
democratic persuasion could be make-or-break for a standard of
legitimacy that is sufficiently relaxed to do the work we want it
for. In the political-liberal view with which Professor
Brettschneider associates himself, a standard of legitimacy
represents a kind of lower common denominator of core liberal
principles of political right and wrong. The standard cannot be
excessively demanding or detailed and still do the work we want
it for—which is to provide a publically viable standard of
justification for collaboration in the country’s practices of
coercion by law, in the face of severe and protracted political
disagreement, including disagreement about what justice
ideally does or does not require. Nor, if it is to do that work, can
the standard of legitimacy contain requirements that are
excessively prone to reasonable interpretive disagreement at
the point of application. This concern for transparency-inapplication of the standard of legitimacy goes far, for example,
to explain the hesitation of liberals to incorporate into their
standard of legitimacy a positive duty of the state to exert itself
toward fulfillment of acknowledged demands of economicdistributive justice, whether cast in terms of basic-needs
satisfaction or of materially fair equality of opportunity.62
See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1798-99.
See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 229 (arguing on those grounds that the
standard of legitimacy must mainly be limited to the “central ranges” of certain basic
liberties on which all reasonable citizens can be expected to agree).
61 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 63, 81, 105.
62 See SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 63-76 (2010) (describing
reasons for resistance and suggesting responses). A leading exemplar is John Rawls, who
both asserts that a principle of materially fair equality of opportunity is a strict requirement
of justice for a regime and declines to treat such a principle as an “essential” component of a
59
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A hesitation of that kind would have obvious application
to the question of making a state’s commitment to a practice of
Brettschneider-style democratic persuasion into a major test
for state legitimacy. An attentive reading of State Speaks
shows how complex, delicate, and potentially divisive would be
a judgment about whether the Obama Administration, say, has
been applying the right amount of anti-hateful persuasive
torque to the elbows of civil society: enough but not too much,
in response to true but not false occasions of need (as defined
by Brettschneider’s “substance-based limit”),63 and just up to but
not across the line that separates persuasion from coercion (as
defined by Brettschneider’s “means-based limit”).64 It seems to me
unlikely in the extreme that Brettschneider could mean that
every American who sincerely answers “no” to that question has
thereby thrown into grave danger his or her moral license for
continued general loyalty to the regime of American law.
II.

TOWARD A BETTER READING

But if Brettschneider does not mean that, then what
does he mean by his invocations of legitimacy as a compelling
reason for reluctant liberals to give ground? Accept with me
that he does, indeed, use “legitimacy” to mean a standard (i) to
be applied categorically (ii) to entire political regimes as (iii) a
relatively relaxed, regulative test for the moral supportability of a
regime that no one could reasonably, in the face of disagreement,
presume to certify as free of serious defect from the standpoint of
justice. And so he also means (if you accept my reading) that a
regime that we would honestly judge to fail such a test is one
that we would lack a moral permission to support. What
Brettschneider nevertheless does not mean (or so I want now to
suggest) is the implausible claim that a state or government
risks forfeiture of its claim to our support by reason of its
rejection, by word or deed, of a commitment to democratic
persuasion à la Brettschneider.

legitimation-worthy constitution. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 6, 227-29; Frank I.
Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism: A Comment on the Constitutional Essentials, 60 DRAKE
L. REV. 1001, 1016 (2012) (describing and explaining this Rawlsian stance).
63 See supra Part I.B.2.
64 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 87-88 (defining a “means-based
limit” on proper democratic persuasion so as to rule out the use of threats and
sanctions against exercise of “fundamental rights” of freedom of expression,
association, or conscience); id. at 116 (proposing to distinguish “persuasion” by “refusal
of a subsidy” from impermissible sanction or threat).
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Brettschneider does not ever actually put his claim in
those terms, as far as I can see.65 What he does plainly say is
that a regime that allowed its signature operations to stray too
far, for too long, from the committed pursuit of the conditions of
free and equal citizenship would thereby forfeit its claim to
legitimacy. It is that moral fact (supposing you accept it as
such)—and not a claimed moral fact that a state’s failure of due
engagement in democratic persuasion amounts, just in itself, to
a forfeiture of legitimacy—that Brettschneider believes should
strongly motivate a demand from us that our governments live up
to a policy of due engagement. The point merits recapitulation:
Brettschneider is best understood to argue not that a state’s failure
of a due-engagement test is, just in itself, a fact that strips it of
legitimacy, but rather that a regime’s more-or-less egregious failure
in the pursuit of free and equal citizenship, thinly defined, would
render it non-legitimate. It is the latter sort of moral fact that is
supposed to give us a compelling reason to want our governments
to be energetically engaged in democratic persuasion.
A.

A Consequentialist Version

And what, then, would be that compelling reason? How
would it run? Most obviously and directly, it would be
consequentialist in form: a regime that fails of a sufficiently robust
commitment to the state’s engagement in democratic persuasion
thereby courts an excessive risk of attrition of both its own and the
society’s commitment to free and equal citizenship, perhaps
eventually to a point where the regime could no longer claim to
pass a categorical test of minimal moral legitimacy. That would be
a cogently formed, consequentialist argument proceeding from a
moral-categorical conception of legitimacy. Brettschneider quite
explicitly makes this argument. “If . . . hateful doctrines were left to
prevail,” he writes, “they could subvert the basic principles of a
legitimate democratic state.”66 The argument does not lack for
force. It could well make good headway with a sizeable fraction of
Brettschneider’s readership.
It may not, however, make much of a dent on the
resistance of those principled, reluctant liberals who enter the
debate braced by strong intuitions that no form of nudge from the
Cf., e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 75. Brettschneider devotes pages to
explaining the mechanisms by which this might occur. See id. at 38-42 (drawing
arguments to this effect from socio-political considerations of “congruence,” “stability,”
“interconnection,” and “public trust”).
65
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state can be construed as non-coercive, so that strict state
neutrality becomes in itself (so to speak) a formal requirement for
legitimacy.67 It seems they would be likely to respond to the
consequentialist argument just as many do when, for example,
cherished rights of privacy come up against quite plausible
assertions of the needs of national security. A legitimate state, they
will say, is and only can be one that treats itself as very strongly
bound to search out and prefer other ways to meet the risk, even if
at some non-negligible cost in reduced expected effectiveness.
It seems, therefore, worth asking whether Brettschneider
has anything more or different to say to our group of hard-core
principled reluctant liberals. I believe that he has.
B.

The “Full Autonomy” of Reasonable Citizens

Brettschneider writes, he says, in response to liberal
theory’s “overemphasis on issues related to the justification of
coercion.”68 “The ideal of free and equal citizenship,” he remarks
by way of partial explanation, “is not just relevant to justifying
coercion; it is relevant to our own moral identities, to the way we
order our various public and private commitments.”69 It is not,
please note, the state’s or the political collective’s identity, but our
own (several) personal identities that are being thus bound up
with a political ideal of free and equal citizenship. What does
Brettschneider mean by this? Perhaps John Rawls, whom we
have already seen serving as a guide to Brettschneider in some
other respects, could tell us.70
Suppose we envisage citizens as possessed of “higherorder interests” in the development and exercise of two socalled “moral powers,” in virtue of which they are owed respect
as free and equal individuals.71 The powers comprise both a
capacity for embrace of a public sense of justice and a capacity
for the pursuit of a self-determined conception of the good.72 On
that understanding of human personal capability and interest,
a convergence of a society’s members on a thin set of principles
for the conduct of politics among citizens thus constituted could
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 13.
69 Id. at 58.
70 I have drawn the following condensation of John Rawls’s idea of a person’s
full autonomy from Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1807, 1829 (1994).
71 RAWLS, supra note 28, at 74, 81.
72 See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 18-20, 74-75, 81-82. Brettschneider is on
board. See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34-35.
67
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be a very great good for every participant. Obviously, the
conduct of politics in one’s society is bound to bear heavily on
the values and satisfactions in a person’s life, and the existence
of the thin consensus could put within everyone’s reach the
fulfillment of a necessary condition of a satisfying life for
persons endowed with higher-order interests in the exercise
and development of both the moral powers. The consensus
makes achievable by everyone the condition that Rawls calls
“full autonomy,” in which a person realizes both the moral
powers synchronously—grasping and acting upon a public
conception of political decency, by and through the same acts of
judgment by which she holds to her own self-responsibly
determined conception of the goods to be pursued in life.73 The
consensus thus further enables satisfaction of what Rawls calls
the “conception-dependent desire” to realize in one’s person an
ideal conception of liberal citizenship.74
We have seen how Brettschneider adopts the Rawlsian
idea of a thin or “political” conception of justice,75 putting that
distinction to work in explaining what he calls a “substancebased limit” on state engagement in persuasion.76 Remember: it
is not every “inegalitarian” view that the state has any proper
business opposing, but only those that are openly and directly
hostile to a thin, “political” ideal of equal citizenship.77 Why so?
“Why not “abandon the limitation of promoting only thin
values,” and instead endorse” as a public value “a full-fledged
conception of equality in all aspects of life?”78 The answer lies in
due respect for the moral and ethical autonomy of citizens. “For
citizens,” writes Brettschneider,
to think freely about whether they endorse the ideal of equal citizenship,
it is important that they be able to reflect about what they take to be a
good life. Part of equal respect entails a respect for citizens to reflect on
matters of the good and to make up their own minds freely . . . . The
value of equal respect is [thus] central to the idea that we should limit
ourselves to a [thin, political] conception of equal citizenship . . . .79

Read in the light of the Rawlsian lesson on full autonomy,
that would explain the connection, alleged by Brettschneider,
See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 77-78.
See id. at 83-84.
75 See BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 53 (“The state is properly concerned,
according to Rawls, with ‘thin’ political conceptions of free and equal citizenship, and not
with comprehensive conceptions of good.”).
76 See supra Part I.B.2.
77 See, e.g., BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 8, 63, 89-90.
78 Id. at 61.
79 Id.
73
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between political ideals such as free and equal citizenship and
“our own moral identities, . . . the way in which we order our
various public and private commitments.”80 Establishment of that
connection also might make a good start at explaining to
reluctant liberals, in non-consequentialist terms, how liberal
principles might call for opposition, in a public voice, to corrosive,
direct assaults on a thin political ideal of free and equal
citizenship. Reduced to the briefest possible summation, the
argument would be that the assaulted ideal is a crucial
component of a minimal conception of political decency, on the
stalwart public affirmation of which the society’s members
depend for the possibility of the realization in their lives of a
highly valued state of full autonomy. That is, I believe, the
deepest argument planted by Corey Brettschneider in the pages
of State Speaks.

80

Id. at 58.

